Dr. Rosenthal's paper was presented in Washington, DC, on June 24, 2009, for a panel on "Leader Development in School of Public Affairs" that included faculty from the University of Virginia, Harvard University, and Texas A&M University. The DC conference, on Leadership and National Security Reform, was cosponsored by The George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service and Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at Texas A&M University, and the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.
The Strategic Studies Institute has published this paper as a chapter in the edited volume, Rethinking Leadership and "Whole of Government" National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, and Prospects (June, 2010). Click on the link to download the book free of charge.
What does one need to know to be a leader in the field of public policy? I want to argue for the centrality of ethics as a basic component of leadership training for anyone pursuing a career in public and international affairs.
If you are a student, please take a moment to ask yourself what you have learned about ethics in your time in the classroom. If you are a teacher or administrator, consider what your curriculum covers in this regard. We know that medical students engage medical ethics, law students study legal ethics, business students take on business ethics, military officers study military ethics, and so on. So let's ask ourselves, what should students and aspiring leaders in public affairs know about ethics to be considered professionals competent to practice?
By ethics, I do not mean simply compliance with law. Compliance is of course an essential part of ethics. But it is only a beginning. Compliance is a floor, a minimum upon which to build. Many actions in government, business, or private life comply with the law but are not optimal from an ethical perspective. Examples are all around us. British members of parliament may not have broken laws when they used expense accounts to bill tax payers for lifestyle enhancements such as moat cleaning, the upkeep of expensive second homes, or the rental of adult movies. But surely this kind of behavior was wrong. In more serious policy matters, it may well be that most of our major banks and financial institutions were in full compliance with the law when it came to the management of credit default swaps and derivative trading. Yet something went very wrong in the area of risk and responsibility. There are many things we can do and still be in compliance with law—but some of them are wrong. Ethical reasoning helps us make these distinctions.
The discipline of ethics begins with Socrates' question: How should one live? Ethics is about choice. What values guide us? What standards do we use? What principles are at stake? And how do we choose between them? An ethical approach to a problem will inquire about ends (goals) and means (the instruments we use to achieve these goals) and the relationship between the two.
Ethical reasoning is the process of raising awareness of moral claims and applying principles to arising circumstances. Ethical reasoning implies an interrogation of the moral claims that surround us rather than a mere listing of do's and don'ts. In a word, ethical inquiry is proactive rather than passive.
The philosopher Simon Blackburn writes that ethics takes as its starting point that: "Human beings are ethical animals … we grade and evaluate, and compare and admire, and claim and justify … Events endlessly adjust our sense of responsibility, our guilt and our shame, and our sense of our own worth and that of others."1
According to Blackburn, ethical inquiry is normative in the sense that it suggests "norms." Norms are what we consider "expected and required" behavior. We all experience functional norms. For example, in the United States, drivers stay on the right-hand side of the road; in the United Kingdom, drivers keep to the left. We also experience moral norms. A moral norm would consist of an expectation such as nondiscrimination in the workplace or the requirement to respect the needs of the most vulnerable members of society (e.g. children, elderly and the infirm). Moral norms are aspirational and prescriptive rather than functional and descriptive—they paint the "ought" rather than the "is." It is this type of norm that I want to focus on in this essay.
A cautionary note is necessary here. Norms, expectations, and ethical claims depend deeply on context. No single normative theory or formula will suffice across different types of examples. One of the great ethicists of recent memory, Isaiah Berlin, famously gave up his Oxford chair in normative theory, so the story goes, because he felt he had no single normative theory to purvey. Berlin did not pretend to offer a grand theory that would meet the test of the many different types of cases he was concerned with.2
Berlin's work reminds us that normative inquiry is a non-perfectionist art. The first lesson of ethics is that values overlap and conflict. The single-minded pursuit of any particular virtue can subvert a competing virtue. So as we often see, freedom can conflict with order, justice with mercy, and truth with loyalty. In international affairs, peace may be our goal, but we cannot ignore the need to confront aggression. Some may chant "no more war." These same people may also chant "never again genocide." Sometimes, tragically and unavoidably, force is needed to prevent harm. Here, and in countless similar examples, we see norms clashing. Berlin lets us know that these clashes happen more often than not.
尽管我们缺乏单一的理论或公式，但柏林和其他人确实为伦理推理提供了一个框架。受柏林和其他实用主义者的启发，我将这一框架视为三个维度的伦理学。
The first dimension focuses on the decision maker—the actor or the agent who makes a choice. We can and should evaluate the acts of individuals, be they presidents, ministers, official representatives, CEOs, community leaders, advocates, employees, consumers or citizens. Each has a role as an autonomous actor.
At first glance, the idea of the autonomous actor seems simple and straightforward. However, we should bear in mind that identity is fluid not static. Most individuals have multiple identities. Consider an example like the following. A single individual could say: I am British. I am a Muslim. I am a woman. I am a professor. I am a feminist. Clearly, many sets of values make up a composite yet single-actor identity in an example like this. Each element of one's identity plays an important role in determining which values and allegiances among many may have priority. Claims of national loyalty, religious obligation, professional codes of conduct, and solidarity around an issue of social justice and concern might all come into play. This is the way life is actually lived, isn't it?3
In addition to single actors, a discussion of agency must also consider the identity, values, and acts of collective actors such as states, corporations, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. One of the most important trends of our time is the growing power of non-state actors—especially multinational corporations. Wal-Mart, Microsoft and other companies of this size and scope rival the capacities of many states in terms of their economic, political and social reach. It is therefore both necessary and proper to ask and answer questions relating to the moral choices of corporate entities. All are moral agents.
The second dimension of ethics has to do with the systems, social arrangements, and conditions that define our range of choices. In short, we need to examine the "rules of the game" by which we live and make decisions. We all live within sets of norms and expectations—some more fair and just than others. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this dimension is to show you examples of when "rational" choices within a set of arrangements yield "bad" or less-than-desirable results. In other words, in some systems, when you do the "right thing" within the system, the net result is sub-optimal.
Here I am thinking of a common example of consumer behavior. When shopping for clothes, it usually makes sense for you to buy the least expensive shirt available when quality between competing options is equal. But because of the supply chain of the global economy, that shirt may be produced in a sweatshop that runs on child labor. Buying the least expensive shirt of equal quality might be rational according to market design—yet the result might be ethically troubling.
This problem exists on many levels of policy and institutional design. For example, consider the nuclear weapons doctrine of MAD—mutual assured destruction. The entire strategic framework is based on the idea of reciprocal threat. Within this system, to insure stability, the most rational thing to do is to make an immoral threat (and be prepared to carry it out).
Clearly, there is something deeply troubling about MAD. It would seem to me to be a worthy goal to try to create frameworks and policies where the "rational" thing to do would be more benign than to make a threat of mutual assured destruction. In brief then, this second dimension calls attention to the fact that we live within institutions, systems, and social arrangements of human design. The rules, norms, and conditions of these arrangements should be subject to ethical evaluation.
The third dimension of ethics is the assertion that we often have the opportunity to improve our situation—to do better. One way to think of this is to consider a standard ethics scenario like this: My mother is sick. I cannot afford medicine. So I steal the medicine from a pharmacy whose managers will not even notice that it is gone. Is stealing the medicine in this circumstance the right thing or the wrong thing to do?
We can discuss this case in terms of my decision as a moral agent—whether I am a thief and villain, a rescuer and a hero, or both. Ethical questions are frequently raised as dilemmas such as this one. In many situations, there is a genuine need to choose between two competing and compelling claims, and ethical reasoning can help to sort these out. But we can also expand the inquiry to ask a broader question beyond the narrow question of whether to steal or not to steal. We can also ask: What kind of community denies medicine to sick people who cannot afford it? Is there something unfair or unethical about this system?
To further illustrate this third dimension, it is useful to note the distinction that Andrew Carnegie drew between charity and philanthropy.4 Charity, according to Carnegie, is the duty to attend to immediate and acute human suffering. Charity translates to feeding the hungry, tending to the sick and destitute, providing relief to victims of natural and man made disasters, and giving shelter to the homeless. Philanthropy is something different—it is an endeavor that reaches above and beyond the imperatives of charity. Philanthropy explores new ways of living, new ideas and institutions to improve society.
While this may sound abstract, Carnegie's philanthropy was specific and practical. He addressed the societal-level problem of education by suggesting and then providing the infrastructure for two institutions we now take for granted: the public library and the teacher pension system. Carnegie believed that every person should have access to knowledge. Universal literacy and educational opportunity would be possible by supporting a free public library system which he began to do all across the United States and to a much lesser extent, the United Kingdom (his place of birth). In his lifetime, Carnegie provided funds to build more than 2500 public library buildings.
Carnegie's library venture was an extraordinary feat totaling $41 million dollars, easily several billion in today's dollars. Yet tellingly, he asked municipal leaders to be partners in the enterprise by providing the books and the funds for upkeep. Carnegie would build the buildings, but communities would be responsible for whatever would happen next. Carnegie thought that if these institutions had real value, communities would invest in them rather than merely accept them passively as gifts. Similarly, when he decided to provide the funds to build Carnegie Hall in New York City, he built the structure in all its grandeur but he did not leave an endowment for maintenance. He believed that if the music hall had genuine value, its patrons—those who benefitted from it—would contribute to its upkeep.
Carnegie also created the first teacher pension institution—now known as TIAA-CREF—to help professionalize the vocation of teaching. If teachers were undervalued, as some surmised, then here was an institution that would contribute to improvement of the educational system by supporting teachers. The idea was simple. But its ramifications were profound. With proper pay and retirements benefits enabled by the new pension system, teaching would become a fully modern profession.
Similarly, when it came to politics, Carnegie believed that new institutions could improve public policy. Specifically, as an advocate for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and disputes, Carnegie supported the mediation and arbitration movement that grew out of Geneva in the mid-19th century. Again, the idea was elegant in its simplicity and grandeur. Just as we have legal mechanisms to arbitrate disputes in domestic society, so too can we have mechanisms in international society for the same purpose. The concept of international law and organization was gaining momentum at the beginning of the 20th century—the movement merely needed new institutions to give it shape and force. In this spirit, Carnegie financed the building of the Peace Palace at The Hague, supported the establishment of the International Court of Justice, and lobbied for the establishment of the League of Nations. Carnegie devoted much of his philanthropy—and his personal energy—to promoting these new institutions and the ideas behind them.
So then the third dimension of ethics expands the range of choices we have in front of us. It is about creating new possibilities. I like to picture this idea in its cartoon form. For me, it is comes to life in the character of Bugs Bunny. The narrative is familiar. Our hero gets into trouble and runs away from a threatening pursuer. But he is eventually backed into a corner. There is no escape. What does he do? He reaches into his pocket and miraculously pulls out a pen or marker. He then proceeds to draw a picture of a window on the blank wall. The image of the window becomes real. Then he climbs out. Sometimes we do face genuine dilemmas—and the lines we draw on the wall remain lines. But other times we can and should imagine better options.
那么，我们如何将对道德三个层面的理解与领导力联系起来呢？领导力是一个与伦理同样广阔的话题，让我们从一些简单的概念开始。理查德-布鲁克海瑟（Richard Brookhiser）在他的新书《乔治-华盛顿的领导力》（George Washington on Leadership）中将领导力描述为 "了解你自己，知道你想去哪里，然后带领他人到达那个新的地方。"5 领导的方式有很多种；有很多风格和无数的例子可供研究。集中分析的方法之一，就是按照布鲁克海瑟的建议，详细研究目的/手段/后果等式。这就引出了三个问题：目标是什么？我们将使用什么手段来达到目标？一路上必须做出哪些类型的权衡和妥协？
Brookhiser 的观点让我想起了我最喜欢的一次关于美国政治史的本科生讲座。讲座由富兰克林-罗斯福的传记作者弗兰克-弗雷德尔教授主讲。他的主题是罗斯福的领导风格。Freidel 教授在黑板的顶部/中央画了一个简单的 X。然后，他从黑板底部向上画了一条之字形的线。他解释说，罗斯福认为自己是一名逆风航行的水手。每一个之字形都代表着接近目标所需的一次往返。
任何水手都知道，在帆船上，你不能直接迎风航行。如果你试图直接迎风航行，风帆就会无用地乱扇，船就会停滞不前，无法前进。这就是水手们所说的 "熨斗"。因此，像其他有经验的舵手一样，罗斯福明白需要来回转舵。每次转舵都意味着不确定和不安的妥协。有时，为了保持之前的成果，他不得不水平转舵。然而，每一次妥协都是必要的，这样才能在逆风中保持前进，而这些逆风会无情地将他打回原形，或将他吹离航道。
如果我们承认领导力是目标驱动的，是需要妥协的，那么我们就会明白，道德不应该是任何公共政策课程或领导力发展计划的边缘。道德既不是奢侈品，也不是需要跨越的障碍。它是决策和领导力本身的核心。
休-拉福莱特（Hugh LaFollette）在他的著作《作为实践的伦理学》（Ethics as Practice）中解释说，伦理学就像医学一样，是一门实践的艺术。6 正如我们学习医学不仅仅是为了了解身体及其功能，而是为了通过促进健康使我们变得更好一样，我们学习伦理学也不仅仅是为了获得哲学上的启迪，而是为了改善我们的生活条件。伦理学帮助我们理解什么是我们真正的价值，以及如何将其与我们的日常生活实践、我们的个人选择以及我们所属机构的政策联系起来。
实用主义者与多元论者一样，认为道德与实用密不可分。让我从我所在的机构Carnegie Council 的历史中举一个例子，该机构由安德鲁-卡内基（Andrew Carnegie）于 1914 年创立，是他的和平捐赠基金之一。当时和现在一样，它的宗旨是成为学术界和政策界领袖的教育资源--思想和行动中心。1937 年，我的前任理事会领导人亨利-阿特金森（Henry Atkinson）在谈到和平运动的未来时，提出了这样的观点：
在引用卡博特博士的话时，阿特金森明白，道德是我们工作的内在因素，而不是外在因素。任何项目如果建立在错误的假设之上，都是不可持续的。建立在无知、误解或错误的理想主义基础上的，都不是好东西，当然也不是伟大的东西。没有现实感的道德承诺，没有对事物实际运作方式的认识，就会导致灾难。而任何实际计划，如果没有任何必须支持它的价值观的意识，也同样是注定要失败的。
因此，伦理和领导力最好被理解为一种现实主义的努力。现实主义者将权力和利益作为人类行为的关键因素。在这一点上，修昔底德 《伯罗奔尼撒战争》中的雅典将军们经常被引述为权威："强者做他们愿意做的事，弱者做他们必须做的事"。我们忽视了这一关于权力的基本观点，后果不堪设想。
然而，有了这一点，老练的现实主义者也会明白，虽然权力的驱动力和利益的最大化可以解释很多问题，但利益的概念往往不仅仅是权力的积累和发挥。利益并不总是显而易见的。它们可能是复杂的、多样的和难以分离的。权力也有明显的局限性。修昔底德及其现实主义弟子马基雅维利和霍布斯很快就认识到，有些结果不能仅靠蛮力来实现，权力的行使总是会带来越权和腐败的阴影。
在理解权力的复杂性方面，现实主义者也许是开明自利概念的最佳支持者。简而言之，开明自利始于我们自身的需求，但同时也考虑到他人的需求和利益。
任何优秀的现实主义者都会告诉你，考虑他人的利益并不是利他主义。相反，这是现实主义的最佳表现。苏珊-尼曼在《道德的清晰度》一书中写道："霍布斯......想象了一种自然状态，在这种状态下，狂野的群族是理性的，他们会同意服从任何会阻止进一步战争的君主，从而阻止他们冲向末日。"8 尼曼通过霍布斯的例子提醒我们，即使是在最黑暗、最粗糙的所有人对所有人的战争中，某种理性的概念也会占上风。人们认识到了限度。屈服于 "利维坦 "的支配力量，合作才成为可能。在霍布斯的自然状态中，冲突是有限度的，围绕开明的自我利益进行合作，尽管形式有限，但也是一种生存策略。
进化生物学和神经科学领域的最新文献研究了这样一种观点，即开明的自我利益可能是自然选择和生存本能的 "硬连接"。罗伯特-赖特（Robert Wright）在《非零：人类命运的逻辑》（Non-Zero: The Logic of Human Destin）一书中探讨了这样一种观点，即观察非零和、双赢、合作的安排，而不是零和、赢家通吃的竞争，可以最好地解释人类的历史和互动。他写道
其结果是一个合作结构的世界，大多数人在大多数时候都能从中受益。神经科学开始向我们展示，"权力意志 "可能与 "合作 "有异曲同工之妙，"合作 "是一种提高生存前景的生物机制。
在一个全球化和高度相互依存的世界中，正确辨别权力和利益不是一件小事。这是领导力的首要要求。我们刚才讨论的伦理的三个层面为这种辨别提供了一个框架。一旦我们确定了方向，就有必要阐明我们所关注的伦理问题的核心原则。根据我的经验，有三项核心原则具有普遍的共鸣，即使对每项原则的解释因时间、地点和环境的不同而大相径庭。这些原则是：多元化、权利和公平。每项原则都提供了一个参照点，我们可以据此与自己和他人反复论证，然后做出有 伦理依据的决定。
Pluralism begins with appreciation for diversity while recognizing what is common in the human experience. A value such as self-interest and or a moral sentiment such as honor or fairness will develop differently according to time, place, and circumstance. Yet there is something that binds us—and that "something" is the capacity to enter into a value system that is not our own.
Simon Blackburn, James Rachels and other philosophers make this point by citing an example from Herodotus' Histories regarding funeral customs.10 We know that in some societies the most common funeral custom is to bury the dead. In other societies it is customary to burn the dead. In still others, the custom is to eat the dead. Members of each society think that their custom is best, and that others are misguided or worse. The point here is not to say that one's own customs are always superior. Nor is the point the opposite: that all customs are relative and are purely matters of convenience. Rather, the point of this example is that there is a central truth—respect for the dead—that takes different forms in different circumstances.
Pluralism's first argument is with monism. Monists are purveyors of moral clarity, single-minded advocates of a truth as they see it. As such monists adhere to familiar custom and dogma, the validity of which his based on faith and will remain beyond human reason and reach. Monists neglect the idea that our understanding of the truth may change over time, especially in light of new information and experience. Monists will resist the idea that truths are many, not one, and that while we often agree on those verifiable observations we call facts, we often do not agree on their meaning. Enlightened realists remind us that humility is required in the face of conviction. Pluralists remind us that, ironically, the one thing we should agree upon is the possibility that we can be wrong. The realist and pluralist point of view does not resonate with monists who are more comfortable in the waters of "moral clarity."
We feel the full weight of pluralism when we view a great work of art or read a classic text. Through these encounters, we can understand the experiences and the value systems of others. We enter into another world and experience part of it as others do. Pluralism is a way to transcend the false dichotomy of monism and relativism. Monism holds that "only one set of values is true, all others are false." Relativism holds that "my values are mine, yours are yours, and if we clash, too bad, neither of us can claim to be right."11 Most of us live in that interesting place in between—and this is the territory of the pluralist.
Reinhold Niebuhr has gained much attention recently as a favorite philosopher of the current president. This is no coincidence, as President Obama has charted a course that veers away from black-and-white, for us or against us, arguments favored by President Bush. The columnist David Brooks captured the Niebuhrian spirit in 2002 in an aptly titled Atlantic magazine article "A Man on a Gray Horse."12 The true moral course, according to Niebuhr, is often found in uneasy compromises and in shades of gray. The grayness of the horse is a reminder that we are far from pure; our history shows us that we sometimes act unjustly and impurely in our pursuit of justice. Niebuhr reminded us that even the "good war" ended with the atomic incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Brooks summarizes Niebuhr's point succinctly: "We should not become intoxicated with our own goodness."
In addition to the dangers of monism, pluralism also addresses the challenges of relativism. Relativism is the idea that every moral claim is just as good as any other. The well-worn example is, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." One can try to make that argument; but it will not alter the fact that terrorism is the random slaying of innocent people. Another tired relativist argument is that norms are merely the reflection of the interests of the power actors who make the rules and stand to gain from their enforcement. While one may make this argument too, it will not alter the fact that freedom makes no sense without order, and that power must be deployed to insure order. Power considerations cannot be wished away; and the actions of powerful actors should not be dismissed out of hand as morally suspect.
Pluralists hold firm against cynicism. They contend that it is both possible and necessary to sort out competing claims. Pluralists observe that every society has strongly developed codes of duty and restraint that promote some notion of human well being. Part of what makes us human is our capacity to understand these norms, how they developed, and why—even if we disagree with them strongly. This open approach enhances the prospects for moral argument.
Isaiah Berlin gives us a classic example of how and why pluralism is not relativism. He writes:
Pluralism is not relativism because Berlin first empathizes, he seeks to understand the Nazi worldview on its own terms, and then he engages in moral argument to refute it.
Another place to plant the flag against relativism is on the high ground of the idea of "rights." By rights we mean protections and entitlements in relation to duties and responsibilities. Rights arguments are put forward against arguments of utility. According to rights theorists from Kant to Jefferson and beyond, there is something fundamental about being human (an inalienable characteristic) that prohibits any person as being treated as something merely "useful," as a means to an end.
The source of human rights is an unending debate. However, I am persuaded by pragmatists like Judith Shklar, Amy Gutmann, and Michael Ignatieff who argue that in the end, foundational arguments may not really matter.14 Empirical observation of the need for human rights and the work that human rights arguments do may be sufficient. After all, the mass murders of the twentieth century are proof of the need for protection. Think of the body counts under the regimes of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao. The facts of the genocides and gulags in such recent memory should be sufficient to make the case that protections are needed. Duties to provide protection therefore follow.
Rights claims raise questions about assignment of responsibilities that are not always clear. One way to think about assignment of responsibilities is to consider rights claims in terms of "perfect" and "imperfect" obligations. Perfect obligations are specific and direct. For example, we have the perfect obligation not to torture. Imperfect obligations are more general, less specific, and inexactly targeted. So in the case of torture, there is the requirement to "to consider the ways and means through which torture can be prevented."15
Although this is not a perfect illustration of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, consider the infamous case of Kitty Genovese. Kitty Genovese was a 28-year old woman who lived in Kew Gardens Queens in 1964. One night on her way home, she was stabbed several times by an unknown assailant and left to die. Her case became widely known because it was alleged that 38 people passed her by as she lay dying in the street. No one helped her. Presumably, each of the 38 passers-by thought someone else would help, or they didn't want to get involved. Whatever the precise details, this scenario helps to elucidate the point about perfect and imperfect duties. We all share the basic duty not to harm. But we also share the basic duty not to allow the conditions of harm, and that when harm is done, to mitigate the effects of it. To echo a previous point, the exercise of imperfect duty is far from altruism. It is in our enlightened self-interest to live in a community where people are not left to die in the streets.
In looking at public policy today, we see several obvious cases where both our direct and indirect participation in the mitigation of harms is inevitable. As participants in the global economy, the global environment and global security, we act both directly as agents and indirectly as bystanders. When we consume and travel, we engage in a system that provides benefits and places burdens. There is really no place to hide. As implicated agents in these social arrangements, our actions will be judged accordingly.
The third principle to consider is fairness. Ideas about fairness are highly subjective and heavily influenced by circumstances. As I have written elsewhere with my co-author Ethan Kapstein, one of the most useful models for illustrating fairness considerations is the Ultimatum Game (UG).16 In the game, two players have the opportunity to divide a pot of money. A proposer (P) makes an offer to a Respondent (R) over how a pot of money should be divided. R can either accept P's offer—in which case the money is divided as P proposed—or R can reject the offer, in which case both players walk away with nothing.
The classic rational actor model of behavior predicts that, in such cases, the split might be something along the lines of 99:1; that is, P would offer R 1 unit while keeping 99 for himself. Since we can usually count on profit-maximizing behavior, this division makes both parties better off and so there is no reason for R to reject it. Maximization strategies therefore lead to unequal divisions of a given pie.
But behavioral economists, repeating the UG in a variety of countries and under and a variety of conditions, have observed a puzzling result. When R's are offered an amount that they consider to be "unfair" they reject it—they would prefer nothing to something. Indeed, knowing that "unfair" offers are likely to be rejected, P's routinely offer about one-half the pot at the outset, and when asked why they do so they normally answer that "this seems fair."
Researchers have drawn several significant findings from the UG, all of which are relevant to the study of moral considerations in world politics. First, P's adopt moral reasoning or other-regarding behavior out of their self-interest. Proposers who do not care about what others think must nonetheless fear rejection of an "unfair" offer and the absence of any payoff whatsoever. The adoption of "fairness considerations" is therefore efficiency enhancing to the extent that it leads to an agreement and thus an increase in welfare for both of the agents.17
Second, the Proposer's concern with achieving an equitable or fair result arises in part from uncertainty about how R will respond to its offer. If P knows that R will willingly accept a greedy offer, P will be much more inclined to propose a lopsided division. Not knowing R's response ex ante, P offers the amount that intuitively seems to be fair (e.g. equal division).
Returning to our theme of enlightened self-interest, fairness and reciprocity suggest that what is good for you is often linked to be what is good for others involved. This is the nature of complex problems and decisions. Taken to the global level, individual interests must be seen in terms of complex interdependence, international norms, and global responsibilities.
虽然我希望这些话能给你们带来关于领导力的积极想法，但我也希望这些话没有许诺太多。重要的是，在结束发言时要有现实感，提醒我们注意人类成就的局限性以及假定和谐结果的危险性。光有良好的愿望是远远不够的。领导者必须始终关注后果。道德要求往往相互冲突。领导者必须做出艰难而不完美的选择。乌托邦的字面意思是 "没有地方"。乌托邦并不存在。从历史上看，大家都知道，正是对乌托邦--完美的社会和结果--的追求导致了人类历史上最糟糕的事件。
诸如 "领导是一项风吹日晒的工作 "和组织 "从头腐烂 "之类的俗语中蕴含着许多道理。领导者肩负的重任迫使他们成为远见卓识者和楷模，然而，他们永远不可能也不应该追求完美。在实现理想愿景和应对日常生活现实的过程中，道德发挥着核心作用。伦理是一个过程，是对理想和妥协的不断反思。领导者有责任提出自己的规范性愿景，并据此衡量自己的行为。我的目标是什么？我的核心价值观是什么？我愿意做出哪些妥协？这些问题永远不会消失。
管理大师们很快就指出，如果我们不努力改进，那么我们肯定会变得更糟。对我们最高愿望的承诺、开放性和自我纠正是领导道德的精髓。通过提出作为伦理探究切入点的三个方面--我们作为道德主体的角色、作为我们所生活的机构中的参与者以及作为定义我们未来的新机构的设计者--我希望我已经让你们感受到了伦理的实际重要性。通过提供多元主义、权利和公平原则作为插旗的地方--或瞄准你的火力点--我希望我给了你一个框架，赋予你力量，引领你踏上有原则的领导之旅。
注释
1 西蒙-布莱克本：《伦理学》：牛津大学出版社，2000 年：牛津大学出版社，2000 年。
2 瑞安-帕特里克-汉利，《柏林与历史》，载于乔治-克劳德和亨利-哈迪编著的《一与多》，2007 年，纽约：
3 Amartya Sen,Identity and Violence, New York：
4 David Nasaw,Andrew Carnegie, New York：企鹅出版社，2006 年。
5 Richard Brookhiser,George Washington on Leadership, New York：Basic Books，2008 年。
6 Hugh LaFollette,The Practice of Ethics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.
7 Henry Atkinson,Prelude to Peace, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937, p. 3.
8 Susan Nieman,Moral Clarity：A Guide for Grown-Up Idealists, Orlando, FL：Harcourt，2008 年，第 30 页。
9 罗伯特-赖特，《非零：人类命运的逻辑》，纽约：Pantheon Books, 2000, p. 5.
10 James Rachels,The Elements of Moral Philosophy：第四版，波士顿：麦格劳-希尔，2003 年，第 16-17 页。
11 以赛亚-柏林：《最初与最后》，《纽约书评》，1997 年 5 月 14 日，第 11 页。
12 大卫-布鲁克斯，"A Man on a Gray Horse"，《大西洋》，2002 年 9 月。
13 以赛亚-柏林，《最初与最后》，《纽约书评》，1997 年 5 月 14 日，第 10 页。
14 Judith Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed.,Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1989; and Michael Ignatieff and Amy Gutmann,Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Princeton, N.J.. Princeton University Press, 2001：普林斯顿大学出版社，2001 年。
15 Amartya Sen，"Elements of aTheory of Human Rights"，《哲学与公共事务》，2004 年。
16 Ethan B. Kapstein 和 Joel H. Rosenthal，"Ethics in International Affairs：An Assessment," inEthics and International Affairs, London：Ashgate, 2009。
17 Ethan B. Kapstein,Economic Justice in an Unfair World, Princeton：普林斯顿大学出版社，2006 年。